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The ￿eld of macroeconomics has witnessed in recent years the development of a new
generation of small-scale monetary business cycle models, generally referred to as
New Keynesian (NK) models or New Neoclassical Synthesis models. The new models
integrate Keynesian elements (imperfect competition, and nominal rigidities) into
a dynamic general equilibrium framework that until recently was largely associated
with the Real Business Cycle (RBC) paradigm. They can be used (and are being
used) to analyze the connection between money, in￿ation, and the business cycle, and
to assess the desirability of alternative monetary policies.
In contrast with earlier models in the Keynesian tradition, the new paradigm
has adopted a dynamic general equilibrium modelling approach. Thus, equilibrium
conditions for aggregate variables are derived from optimal individual behavior on
the part of consumers and ￿rms, and are consistent with the simultaneous clearing
of all markets. From that viewpoint, the new models have much stronger theoretical
foundations than traditional Keynesian models.
In addition, the emphasis given to nominal rigidities as a source of monetary
non neutralities also provides a clear diﬀerentiation between NK models and classical
monetary frameworks.1 In the latter, the key mechanism through which money may
have some real eﬀects is the so-called in￿ation tax. But those eﬀects are generally
acknowledged to be quantitatively small and not to capture the main sources of
monetary non-neutralities at work in actual economies.2
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, it tries to provide an overview of
some of the recent developments in the literature on monetary policy in the presence of
nominal rigidities. Given the voluminous literature generated by researchers working
in this area, and the usual space constraints, that overview will necessarily be partial.3
Second, the paper seeks to emphasize the existence of several dimensions in which
the recent literature provides a new perspective on the linkages among monetary
policy, in￿ation, and the business cycle. I would like to argue that the adoption of
an explicitly optimizing, general equilibrium framework has not been super￿uous; on
the contrary, the recent literature has yielded many genuinely new insights which, by
their nature, could hardly have been obtained with, say, a textbook IS-LM model.
1By classical I mean monetary models with perfect competition and ￿exible prices, and no other
frictions (other than those associated with the existence of money).
2See, e.g., Cooley and Hansen (1989) for an analysis of a classical monetary model. Several
authors have also emphasized the existence of frictions in ￿nancial markets as a potential source
of nontrivial (and more realistic) monetary non neutralities. See, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1996, 1999).
3It is also likely to somewhat biased in that it attaches a disproportionate weight to issues or
areas in which I happen to have done some research myself. Alternative surveys of some of those
developments, with a somewhat diﬀerent focus, can be found in Goodfriend and King (1997) and
Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999). The present paper does not discuss any of the open economy
extensions of NK models, and the issues that openness brings about; the interested reader will ￿nd
in Lane (2000) a useful survey of developments in that front.
1Hence, and contrary to what some macroeconomists may believe, it is not all dØja vu
and we are not back to where we stood before Kydland and Prescott (1982).
For concreteness, let me summarize next some of the ￿ndings, ideas, or features
of the new models which one may view as novel, relative to the traditional Keynesian
literature. Needless to say the list is not meant to be exhaustive; instead it focuses
on some of the issues that are discussed in more detail in the remainder of the paper.
￿ The NK models bring a new perspective on the nature of in￿ation dynamics.
First, they emphasize the forward looking nature of in￿ation.A sa r g u e db e l o w ,
that property must be inherent to any model where prices are set by ￿rms
facing constraints on the frequency with which they can adjust the price of
the goods they produce. Firms re-setting their prices today recognize that the
prices they choose are likely to remain eﬀective for more than one period. Such
￿rms will ￿nd it optimal, when making their current pricing decisions, to take
into account their expectations regarding future cost and demand conditions.
Since changes in the aggregate price level are (by de￿nition) a consequence
of current pricing decisions, it follows that in￿a t i o nm u s th a v ea ni m p o r t a n t
forward looking component. That property appears clearly re￿ected in the so
called New Phillips curve. As discussed below, it also appears to be a feature of
the data. Second, NK models also stress the important role played by variations
in markups (or, equivalently, in real marginal costs) as a source of changes in
aggregate in￿ation. The latter can thus be interpreted as the consequence of
￿rms￿ periodic attempts to correct the misalignment between actual and desired
markups.
￿ The concept of output gap plays a central role in the new optimizing sticky
price models, both as a force underlying ￿uctuations in in￿a t i o n( t h r o u g hi t s
in￿uence on marginal costs), as well as a policy target. But the notion of output
gap found in the recent literature bears little resemblance with the ad-hoc,
largely atheoretical output gap measures used in traditional empirical analyses
of in￿ation and monetary policy. In the new paradigm the output gap has
a precise meaning: it is the deviation of output from its equilibrium level in
the absence of nominal rigidities. Under some assumptions on technology and
preferences it is possible to construct a measure of the output gap. As shown
below, the resulting measure for the postwar U.S. shows little resemblance with
traditional output gap measures.
￿ In the NK model, the transmission of monetary policy shocks to real variables
works through a conventional interest rate channel. Yet, such transmission
mechanism does not necessarily involve a liquidity eﬀect, in contrast with the
textbook IS-LM model.
￿ In addition to being a source of monetary nonneutralities, the presence of sticky
prices may also have strong implications for the economy￿s response to non-
2monetary shocks. In particular, recent research has shown that unless mone-
tary policy is suﬃciently accommodating, employment is likely to drop in the
short run in response to a favorable technology shock. That result is at odds
with the predictions of standard RBC models, and contrasts sharply with the
mechanisms underlying ￿uctuations emphasized in the RBC literature. Most
interestingly, the prediction of a negative short run comovement between tech-
nology and employment appears to be supported by some recent estimates of
the eﬀects of identi￿ed technology shocks.
￿ The adoption of a general equilibrium framework by the recent sticky price
literature permits an explicit utility-based welfare analysis of the consequences of
alternative monetary policies, and can thus be used as the basis for the design of
an optimal (or, at least, desirable) monetary policy. Hence, in the baseline sticky
price model developed below the optimal policy stabilizes the price level and the
output gap completely. Such a goal is fully attainable, since the central bank does
not face a tradeoﬀ between output gap and in￿ation stabilization. Interestingly,
the optimality of a zero in￿ation arises independently from any desire to reduce
the distortion associated with the so called in￿ation tax; instead, it is exclusively
motivated by the policymaker￿s attempt to oﬀset the distortions associated
with staggered price setting, in order to replicate the ￿exible price equilibrium
allocation.
￿ While the optimal monetary policy requires that the central bank respond sys-
tematically to the underlying disturbances in a speci￿cw a y ,asimple policy rule
that has the central bank adjust (suﬃciently) the interest rate in response to
variations in in￿ation and/or the output gap generally provides a good approxi-
mation to the optimal rule (with the implied welfare losses being small). This is
generally not the case for other well known simple rules, like a constant money
growth or an interest rate peg.
￿ An interesting new insight found in the recent literature relates to the issue
of rules vs. discretion, and the role of credibility in monetary policy. The
main result can be summarized as follows: in the presence of a tradeoﬀ between
output and in￿ation, society will generally gain from having a central bank that
can (credibly) commit to a state-contingent plan. Most interestingly, such gains
from commitment arise even in the absence of a classic in￿ation bias, i.e. even
if the central bank has no desire to push output above its natural level. That
result overturns an implication of the classic Barro-Gordon analysis, where the
gains from commitment arise only if the central bank sets a target for output
that does not correspond to its natural level.
￿ T h ec o e x i s t e n c eo fstaggered wage setting with staggered price setting has im-
portant implications for monetary policy. In particular, the variations in wage
markups caused by not-fully-￿exible wages generate a tradeoﬀ between output
3gap and in￿ation stabilization that is absent from the basic sticky price model.
Furthermore, recent research has shown that in such an environment a central
bank will generally be unable to eliminate completely the distortions caused by
nominal rigidities. The optimal policy will seek to strike a balance between sta-
bilization of three variables: the output gap, price in￿ation and wage in￿ation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a baseline
sticky price model and derives the corresponding equilibrium conditions. Section 3
focuses on one of the building blocks of that model￿the New Phillips Curve￿, and
discusses some of its implications and empirical relevance. Section 4 uses the baseline
model to analyze the eﬀects and transmission of monetary and technology shocks
in the presence of sticky prices. Section 5 turns its attention to the endogenous
component of monetary policy: it derives the optimal policy rule and assesses the
implications of deviating from it by following a simple rule instead. It also shows
how the form of the optimal policy is altered by the presence of an in￿ation/output
tradeoﬀ, and discusses the gains from commitment that arise in that context. Section
6 brings sticky wages into the picture and analyzes its consequences for the eﬀects of
monetary policy and its optimal design.
2 Money and Sticky Prices: A Baseline Model
In this section I lay out a simple model that I take as representative of the new
generation of dynamic sticky price models. It is a version of the Calvo (1983) model
with staggered price setting.4 For simplicity, and in order to focus on the essential
aspects of the model, I will work with a simpli￿ed version which abstracts from capital
accumulation and the external sector. Next I describe brie￿y the main assumptions,
and derive the key equilibrium conditions.5
2.1 Households


















4Alternative approaches to modelling price rigidities have been used in the literature. Those
include (a) models with staggered price setting ￿ la Taylor (with a certain time between price
adjustments), as exempli￿ed by the work of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998), and (b) models
with convex costs of price adjustment (but no staggering), as in Hairault and Portier (1993) and
Rotemberg (1996).
5See, e.g., King and Wolman (1996), Yun (1996) and Woodford (1996) for a detailed derivation
of the model￿s equilibrium conditions.
4subject to a (standard) sequence of budget constraints and a solvency condition. Nt














1−ε represent the aggregate price index, where Pt(i) de-
notes the price of good i ∈ [0,1]. The solution to the consumer￿s problem can be
summarized by means of three optimality conditions (two static and one intertem-
poral), which I represent in log-linearized form (henceforth, lower case letters denote
the logarithm of the original variables).
First, the optimal allocation of a given amount of expenditures among the diﬀerent
goods generated by the set of demand schedules implies:
ct(i)=−ε (pt(i) − pt)+ct (2)
Second, and under the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market, the
supply of hours must satisfy:
wt − pt = σ ct + ϕ nt (3)
where w is the (log) nominal wage.




(rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ)+Et{ct+1} (4)
where rt is the yield on a nominally riskless one period bond (the nominal interest
rate, for short), πt+1 is the rate of in￿ation between t and t +1 ,a n dρ = −logβ
represents the time discount rate (as well as the steady state real interest rate, given
the absence of secular growth).
Let me also postulate, without deriving it, a standard money demand equation:
mt − pt = yt − η rt (5)
which will be used in some of the exercises described below. Notice that a unit income
elasticity of money demand is assumed, which is in line with much of the existing
empirical evidence.
2.2 Firms
I assume a continuum of ￿r m s ,e a c hp r o d u c i n gad i ﬀerentiated good with a technology
Yt(i)=At Nt(i)
5where (log) productivity at =l o g ( At) follows an exogenous, diﬀerence-stationary
stochastic process represented by:




t} is white noise and ρa ∈ [0,1).
I assume that employment is subsidized at a constant subsidy rate ν.H e n c e ,a l l
￿rms face a common real marginal cost, which in equilibrium is given by
mct = wt − pt − at − ν (6)
Total demand for each good is given by:
Yt(i)=Ct(i)+Gt(i)
where Gt denotes government purchases. For simplicity, I assume that the gov-
ernment consumes a fraction τt of the output of each good. Hence, and letting








ε−1 denote aggregate output. The clearing of all goods
markets implies
yt = ct + gt (7)
where yt =l o g Yt. In what follows I assume that a simple AR(1) process for the
demand shock gt,





t} is white noise (and orthogonal to εa
t) and ρg ∈ [0,1).





(rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ)+Et{yt+1} +( 1− ρg) gt (8)
In addition, and using the fact that nt =l o g
R 1
0 Nt(i) di, one can derive the
following mapping between labor input and output aggregates:7
nt = yt − at (9)
6One can also interpret gt as a shock to preferences or, more broadly, as an exogenous component
of aggregate demand.
7For nondegenerate distributions of prices across ￿rms the previous equation holds only up to a








can be interpreted as an indicator of relative price distortions. See Yun (1996) and King and Wolman
(1996) for a detailed discussion.
6Finally, combining (3), (6), (7), and (9), we obtain an expression for the equilib-
rium real marginal cost in terms of aggregate output and productivity:
mct =( σ + ϕ) yt − (1 + ϕ) at − σ gt − ν (10)
Notice that in deriving all the equilibrium relationships above I have not made use
of any condition specifying how ￿rms set their prices. Next I describe two alternative
models of price setting, which diﬀer in the existence or not of restrictions on the
frequency with which ￿rms may adjust prices.
2.3 Flexible Price Equilibrium
Suppose that all ￿rms adjust prices optimally each period, taking the path of aggre-
gate variables as given. The assumption of an isoelastic demand implies that they
will choose a markup (de￿ned as the ratio of price to marginal cost) given by ε
ε−1.
That markup will be common across ￿rms, and constant over time. Hence, it follows
that the real marginal cost (i.e., the inverse of the markup) will also be constant, and
given by
mct = −￿





.8 Furthermore, given identical prices and demand
conditions the same quantities of all goods will be produced and consumed.
In that case the equilibrium processes for output, consumption, hours, and the
expected real rate are given by:
yt = γ + ψa at + ψg gt (11)
ct = γ + ψa at − (1 − ψg) gt (12)
nt = γ +( ψa − 1) at + ψg gt (13)
rrt = ρ + σψaρa ∆at + σ(1 − ψg)(1 − ρg) gt (14)
where ψa =
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ, ψg = σ
σ+ϕ,a n dγ =
ν−￿
σ+ϕ. Henceforth, I refer to the above equilibrium
values as the natural levels of the corresponding variable.
Notice that, in the absence of nominal rigidities, the equilibrium behavior of the
above variables is independent of monetary policy. Furthermore, if γ =0 , the equi-
librium allocation under ￿exible prices coincides with the eﬃcient allocation, i.e., the
one that would obtain under ￿exible prices, perfect competition, and no distortionary
taxation of employment (i.e., ν = ￿ =0 ). Attaining that eﬃcient allocation requires
setting ν = ￿, i.e. using an employment subsidy that exactly oﬀsets the distortion as-
sociated with monopolistic competition. As further discussed below, that assumption
will generally be maintained in what follows.9
8Henceforth, an upper bar is used to denote the equilibrium value of a variable under ￿exible
prices.
9A similar assumption can be found in Woodford (1999), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1999), and Gali
and Monacelli (1999).
72.4 Staggered Price Setting
The exact form of the equation describing aggregate in￿ation dynamics depends on
the way sticky prices are modeled. Let me follow Calvo (1983), and assume that each
￿rm resets its price in any given period only with probability 1 − θ, independently
of other ￿rms and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, a measure
1 − θ of producers reset their prices each period, while a fraction θ keep their prices
unchanged. Let p∗
t denote the log of the price set by ￿rms adjusting prices in period
t.10The evolution of the price level over time can be approximated by the log-linear
diﬀerence equation:
pt = θ pt−1 +( 1− θ) p
∗
t (15)
One can show that a ￿rm seeking to maximize its value will choose the price of
its good according to the (approximate) log-linear rule
p
∗







i.e., prices are set as a markup over a weighted average of current and expected future
nominal marginal costs {mcn
t+k}.
In order to get some intuition for the form of that rule, let ￿t,t+k = p∗
t − mcn
t+k
denote the markup in period t+k of a ￿rm that last set its price in period t.W ec a n
rewrite (16) as ￿ =( 1−βθ)
P∞
k=0(βθ)k Et{￿t,t+k} which yields a simple interpretation
of the pricing rule: ￿rms set prices at a level such that a (suitable) weighted average
of anticipated future markups matches the optimal frictionless markup ￿.
If ￿rms do not adjust prices optimally each period, real marginal costs will no
longer be constant. On the other hand, in a perfect foresight steady state with zero
in￿ation, all ￿rms will be charging their desired markup. Hence, the steady state
marginal cost, mc, will be equal to its ￿exible price counterpart (i.e., −￿). Let
d mct = mct − mc denote the percent deviation of marginal cost from its steady state
level. We can then combine (15) and (16), and, after some algebra, obtain a simple
stochastic diﬀerence equation describing the dynamics of in￿ation, with marginal
costs as a driving force:
πt = β Et{πt+1} + λ d mct (17)
where λ = θ
−1(1 − θ)(1 − βθ).
Furthermore, ￿rms￿ inability to adjust prices optimally every period will generally
imply the existence of a wedge between output and its natural level. Let me denote
that wedge by xt = yt − yt , and refer to it as the output gap. It follows from (10)
that the latter will be related to marginal cost according to
d mct =( σ + ϕ) xt. (18)
10Notice that they will all be setting the same price, since they face an identical problem.
8Combining (17) and (18) yields the familiar New Phillips Curve:
πt = β Et{πt+1} + κ xt (19)
where κ = λ(σ + ϕ).
It will turn out to be convenient for the subsequent analysis to rewrite equilibrium




(rt − Et{πt+1} − rrt)+Et{xt+1} (20)
Equations (19) and (20), together with a speci￿cation of monetary policy (i.e., of
how the interest rate evolves over time), and of the exogenous processes {at}and {gt}
(which in turn determine the natural rate of interest), fully describe the equilibrium
dynamics of the baseline model economy.
Having laid out the equations of the baseline sticky price model, I now turn to a
discussion of some of its implications for monetary policy, in￿ation and the business
cycle.
3T h e N a t u r e o f I n ￿ation Dynamics
The nature of in￿ation dynamics is arguably the most distinctive feature of the New
Keynesian paradigm. Yet, an important similarity with traditional Keynesian models
remains on this front: as illustrated by (19), the evolution of in￿a t i o ni nt h eN Km od e l
is determined by some measure of the level of economic activity or, more precisely, of
its deviation from some baseline level. Thus, and in contrast with classical monetary
models, a change in monetary conditions (e.g., an increase in the money supply)
has no direct eﬀect on prices. Its eventual impact is only indirect, working through
whatever changes in the level of economic activity it may induce. That common
feature notwithstanding, there exist two fundamental diﬀerences between (19) and
a traditional Phillips curve. First, in the new paradigm in￿a t i o ni sd e t e r m i n e di na
forward looking manner. Second, the measure of economic activity that is the driving
force behind in￿ation ￿uctuations is precisely pinned down by the theory, and may
not be well approximated by conventional output gap measures. Next we discuss
those two features in more detail, together with their empirical implications and the
related evidence.
3.1 The Forward Looking Nature of In￿ation
The traditional Phillips Curve relates in￿ation to some cyclical indicator as well as
its own lagged values. A simple and common speci￿cation takes the form:
πt = πt−1 + δ b yt + εt (21)
9where b yt the log deviation of GDP from some baseline trend (or from some measure of
potentialGDP)and εt is a random disturbance. Sometimes additional lags of in￿ation
or detrended GDP are added. Alternative cyclical indicators may also be used (e.g.,
the unemployment rate). Let me emphasize two properties, which will generally hold
independently of the details. First, past in￿ation matters for the determination of
current in￿ation. Second, current in￿ation is positively correlated with past output;
in other words, output leads in￿ation.
The previous properties stand in contrast with those characterizing the New







It is clear from the expression above that past in￿ation is not, in itself, a relevant
factor in determining current in￿ation. Furthermore, in￿ation is positively correlated
with future output, given {yt+k}.I no t h e rw o r d s ,i n ￿ation leads output, not the other
way around. Thus, we see that under the new paradigm, in￿ation is a forward looking
phenomenon. The intuition behind that property is clear: in a world with staggered
price setting, in￿ation￿positive or negative￿arises as a consequence of price decisions
by ￿rms currently setting their prices; as made clear by (16), those decisions are
in￿uenced by current and anticipated marginal costs, which are in principle unrelated
to past in￿ation.
Interestingly, many critical assessments of the New Keynesian paradigm have
f o c u s e do nt h ef o r w a r dl o o k i n gn a t u r eo ft h ei n ￿a t i o nd y n a m i c se m b e d d e di ni t .
Thus, a number of authors have argued that, while the NPC may be theoretically
more appealing, it cannot account for many features of the data that motivated the
traditional Phillips curve speci￿cation. In particular, they point out that the pattern
of dynamic cross-correlation between in￿ation and detrended output observed in the
data suggests that output leads in￿ation, not the other way around.11 In other words,
the data appears to be more consistent with a traditional, backward-looking Phillips
curve than with the new. That evidence seems reinforced by many of the estimates
of hybrid Phillips curves of the form
πt = γb πt−1 + γf Et{πt+1} + δ (yt − yt) (23)
found in the literature, and which generally point to a signi￿cant (if not completely
dominant) in￿uence of lagged in￿ation as a determinant of current in￿ation.12
That critical assessment of the NPC has been revisited recently by Sbordone
(1999), Gertler and Gal￿ (1999; henceforth, GG), and Gertler, Gal￿ and L￿pez-Salido
(2000; henceforth, GGL). Those authors argue that some of the existing evidence
against the relevance of the NPC may be distorted by the use of detrended GDP (or
11This point has been stressed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), among others.
12See, Chadha, Masson, and Meredith (1992) and Fuhrer (1997), among others.
10similar) as a proxy for the output gap. As discussed in the next subsection, that
proxy is likely to be very poor and, thus, a source of potentially misleading results.
Furthermore, even if detrended GDP was highly correlated with the true output gap,
the conditions under which the latter is proportional to the (current) marginal cost
may not be satis￿ed; that would render (19) invalid and lead to a misspeci￿cation of
the NPC formulation used in empirical work.
As a way to overcome both problems the abovementioned researchers have gone
back one step and estimated (17) instead, thus taking real marginal cost as the (imme-
diate) driving force underlying changes in in￿ation. That formulation of the in￿ation
equation relies on weaker assumptions, since condition (18) is no longer required to
hold. On the other hand it embeds two essential ingredients of in￿ation dynamics
under the new paradigm: (a) the forward looking nature of price-setting decisions
and (b) their lack of synchronization (staggering).
Most importantly, they note that a theory-consistent, observable measure of aver-
age real marginal costs can be derived under certain assumptions on technology, and
independently of price-setting considerations.13For the sake of concreteness, suppose
that (a) labor productivity is exogenous, (b) ￿r m st a k ew a g e sa sg i v e n ,a n d( c )t h e r e
are no costs of labor adjustment. Then it is easy to show that real marginal costs will
be proportional to the labor income share; it follows that d mct = b st,w h e r eb st denotes
the percent deviation of the labor income share from its (constant) mean.
Using U.S. data on in￿ation and the labor income share, GG have estimated (17),
as well as structural parameters β and θ using an instrumental variables estimator.
That evidence has recently been extended by GGL to Euro area data. An exercise
in a similar spirit has been carried out by Sbordone, using an alternative approach
to estimation based on a simple goodness-of-￿t criterion that seeks to minimize the
model￿s forecast error variance, given a path for expected marginal costs.
The ￿ndings that emerge in that recent empirical work are quite encouraging
for the NPC: when the latter is estimated in a way consistent with the underlying
theory it appears to ￿t the data much better than it had been concluded by the
earlier literature. Thus, all the parameter estimates have the predicted sign and
show plausible values. In particular, estimates of parameter θ imply an average price
duration of about one year, which appears to be roughly consistent with the survey
evidence.14
The GG and GGL papers also provide an extension of the baseline theory un-
derlying the NPC to allow for a constant fraction of ￿rms that set prices according
to a simple, backward-looking rule of thumb. The remaining ￿rms set prices in a
forward-looking way, as in the baseline sticky price model. The reduced form in￿a-
tion equation that results from the aggregation of pricing decisions by both types of
￿rms takes a hybrid form similar to (23), with a measure of marginal cost replacing
13See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a detailed discussion of alternative measures of mar-
ginals costs.
14See Taylor (1999) for an overview of that evidence.
11the output gap, and with coeﬃcients γb and γf being a function of all structural
parameters (now including the fraction of ￿rms that are backward looking). The
￿ndings there are also quite encouraging for the baseline NPC: while backward look-
ing behavior is often statistically signi￿cant, it appears to have limited quantitative
importance. In other words, while the baseline pure forward looking model is rejected
on statistical grounds, it is still likely to be a reasonable ￿rst approximation to the
in￿ation dynamics of both Europe and the U.S.15
3.2 The Nature of the Output Gap
According to the NPC paradigm, in￿ation ￿uctuations are associated with variations
in the output gap, i.e., in the deviation of output from its level under ￿exible prices.16
The output gap and its volatility also play an important role in welfare evaluations:
as shown in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the variance of the output gap is one
of the key terms of a second order approximation to the equilibrium utility of the
representative consumer, in the context of a model similar to the one sketched above.
The concept of output gap associated with the NK model is very diﬀerent from the
one implicit in most empirical applications. In the latter, the concept of output gap
used would be better characterized as a measure of detrended output, i.e., deviations
of log GDP from a smooth trend. That trend is computed using one of a number of
available procedures, but the main properties of the resulting series do not seem to
hinge critically on the exact procedure used. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which
plots three ￿output gap￿ series for the U.S. economy commonly used in empirical
work. Those gap measures correspond to three alternative estimates of the trend:
(a) a ￿tted quadratic function of time, (b) a Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered series, (c) the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce￿s estimate of potential output. The fact that the implied
trend is a very smooth series has two implications. First, the bulk of the ￿uctuations
in output at business cycle frequencies are attributed to ￿uctuations in the output
gap. Second, the correlation among the three output gap measures is very high.
But, as argued in GG and Sbordone, the use of detrended GDP as a proxy for
the output gap does not seem to have any theoretical justi￿cation. In eﬀect, that
approach implicitly assumes that the natural level of output {yt} can be represented
as a smooth function of time. Yet, the underlying theory implies that any shock
(other than monetary shocks) may be a source of ￿uctuations in that natural level of
output; as a result, the latter may be quite volatile.17In fact, one of the tenets of the
RBC school was that the bulk of the business cycle in industrial countries could be
15Interestingly, as shown in GGL, the backward looking component appears to be even less im-
portant in Europe than in the US.
16As should be clear from the derivation of (19) that relationship is not a primitive one. It arises
from the proportionality between the output gap and markups (or real marginal costs) which holds
under some standard, though by no means general, assumptions.
17See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for an illustration of this point in the context of a
calibrated version of a sticky price model..
12interpreted as the equilibrium response of a frictionless economy to technology and
other real shocks; in other words, to ￿uctuations in the natural level of output !.
U n d e rt h ea s s u m p t i o n sm a d ei ns e c t i o n2 ,a n da ss h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 8 ) ,t h e
true output gap is proportional to deviations of real marginal cost from steady state.
Hence, a measure of real marginal cost can be used to approximate (up to a scalar
factor) the true, or model-based, output gap. Figure 2 displays a time series for the
U.S. output gap, de￿ned as xt =0 .5 b st. Notice that this is consistent, e.g., with
parameter settings σ =1and ϕ =1; those values arguably fall within a reasonable
range. In addition, Figure 2 also shows the deviation of log GDP from a ￿tted
quadratic trend, a popular proxy for the output gap in empirical applications. Let
me not emphasize here the apparent diﬀerences in volatility between the two series,
since the model pins down the output gap only up to a scale factor (determined by
the choice of settings for σ and ϕ). Instead I want to focus on their comovement:
if detrended GDP was a good proxy for the output gap, we should observe a strong
positive comovement between the two series. But a look at Figure 3 makes it clear
that no obvious relationship exists; in fact, the contemporaneous correlation between
them turns out to be slightly negative. As argued in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), the
previous ￿nding calls into question the validity of empirical tests of the New Phillips
curve that rely on detrended GDP as a proxy for the output gap, including informal
assessments based on the patterns of cross-correlations between that variable and
in￿ation.
4T h e E ﬀects and Transmission of Shocks
Having laid out the baseline NK model and discussed some of its most distinctive
elements, I turn to the examination of some of its predictions regarding the eﬀects of
some aggregate shocks on the economy.
Much of the quantitative analysis that follows relies on a baseline calibration of
the model, though a number of variations from it are also considered. In the baseline
calibration, I assume a log utility for consumption, which corresponds to σ =1 .T h i s
is a standard assumption, and one that would render the model consistent with a
balanced growth path if secular technical progress was introduced. I also set ϕ =1 ,
which implies a unit wage elasticity of labor supply. The baseline value for the semi-
elasticity of money demand with respect to the (quarterly) interest rate, η,i ss e tt o
unity. This is roughly consistent with an interest elasticity of 0.05 found in empirical
estimates and used in related work.18 T h eb a s e l i n ec h o i c ef o rθ is 0.75. Under
the Calvo formalism that value implies an average price duration of one year. This
appears to be in line with econometric estimates of θ,a sw e l la ss u r v e ye v i d e n c e . 19
The elasticity of substitution ε is set to 11, a value is consistent with a 10 percent
18See, e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997)
19Taylor (1999) summarizes the existing survey evidence.
13markup in the steady state. Finally, I set β =0 .99, which implies an average annual
real return of about 4 percent.
4.1 Monetary Policy Shocks
As is well known, the presence of nominal rigidities is a potential source of nontrivial
real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. This is also the case for the baseline NK
model, where ￿rms do not always adjust the price of their good when they receive
new information about costs or demand conditions.
What are the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks in the above framework?
How are they transmitted? In order to focus attention on these issues we abstract
momentarily from non-monetary shocks by assuming at = gt =0 ,f o ra l lt. Without
loss of generality I also set yt =0 ,a l lt.






Et{rt+k − πt+k+1 − ρ} (24)
We see that in the NK model exogenous interventions by the monetary author-
ity will have an eﬀect on output only to the extent they in￿uence current or future
expected short term real interest rates or, equivalently￿under the expectations hy-
pothesis of the term structure-only if they aﬀect the current long term real rate.
To understand how the transmission works, I specify monetary policy by assuming
an exogenous path for the growth rate of the money supply, given by the stationary
process:
∆mt = ρm ∆mt−1 + ε
m
t (25)
where ρm ∈ [0,1). Under that assumption, the equilibrium dynamics of the baseline



















































As a baseline setting for ρm Ic h o o s e0.5, a value consistent with the estimated
autoregressive process for M1 in the United States. The estimated standard deviation
of the money shock, denoted by σm, is approximately 0.01. For convenience, I set
σm =1, which requires that the units of all variables be interpreted as percentage
points or percent deviations.20
Figure 3 displays the dynamic responses of output, in￿ation, and both nominal
and (ex-ante) real rates to a one-standard deviation money supply shock, under the
20Cooley and Hansen (1989), Walsh (1998) and Yun (1996) justify the choice of that calibration.
14baseline calibration. For ease of interpretation, the rates of in￿ation and interest rate
d i s p l a y e di nt h e￿gure have been annualized (the calibration is based on quarterly
rates, however).
I would like to highlight two features of the responses shown in Figure 3. First,
they suggest that in the simple sticky price model considered here a ￿typical￿ mon-
etary shock has strong, and highly persistent, eﬀects on output. Second, under the
baseline calibration, a monetary expansion is predicted to raise the nominal rate; in
other words, the calibrated model does not predict the existence of a liquidity eﬀect.
Next I discuss brie￿y each of these properties in turn.
4.1.1 The Eﬀects of Money on Output: Strength and Persistence
What level of GNP volatility can be accounted for by the basic NK model, when
shocks to an exogenous money supply process (calibrated in accordance to postwar
U.S. data) are the only source of ￿uctuations? For our baseline calibration the answer
to the previous question is a surprisingly large value: 2.1 percent. That value is
signi￿cantly above the estimated standard deviation of detrended U.S. GDP in the
postwar period.21 Interestingly, and despite their focus on the persistence of the
shocks, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) document a dual result in the context of
the Taylor-type model: they calibrate σm in order to match the volatility of output,
l e a d i n gt h e mt os e ta tav a l u ew e l lb e l o wt h ee s t i m a t e do n e . 22
While the previous exercise is useful at pointing out the powerful real eﬀects of
changes in the money supply, there are many reasons not to take it too literally. For
one, the estimated variance of money supply shocks is likely to overstate the true
volatility of the unexpected component of money since, by construction, speci￿cation
(25) ignores the existence of any endogenous component of variations in the money
supply.23That notwithstanding, Figure 3 makes clear that the eﬀects of monetary
policy on output are far from negligible: on impact, a one percent increase in the
money supply raises output by more than 1 percent, while the implied increase in the
price level is of about 2.4 percent (annualized).
In addition to the large output eﬀects of money discussed above, the baseline
model also implies that such eﬀects are quite persistent. That property is apparent
in the impulse response of output displayed in Figure 3. In particular, the half life of
that output response under the baseline calibration is 3.2 quarters.24
21Stock and Watson (1999) report a standard deviation of 1.66 percent for the period 53-96, using
a band-pass ￿lter to isolate cyclical ￿uctuations. Other estimates in the literature are similar.
22See also Walsh (1998) and Yun (1996) for a similar result.
23The analogy with the calibration of technology changes based on an estimated process for the
Solow residual seems appropriate.
24The previous result contrasts with the ￿ndings of Chari et al. (2000), who stress the diﬃculty in
generating signi￿cant eﬀects of money on output beyond the duration of price (which is deterministic
in their framework).
154.1.2 The Presence (or Lack Thereof) of a Liquidity Eﬀect
As shown in Figure 3, under the baseline calibration of the NK model, a monetary
expansion raises the nominal rate. Hence, and in contrast with a textbook model,
the calibrated model does not predict the existence of a liquidity eﬀect. Still, that
feature does not prevent monetary policy from transmitting its eﬀects through an
interest rate channel: as shown in the same ￿gure, the (ex-ante) real rate declines
substantially when the monetary expansion is initiated, remaining below its steady
state level for a protracted period. As (24) makes clear, it is that persistent decline
which induces the observed expansion in aggregate demand and output.
The absence of a liquidity eﬀect is not, however, a robust feature of the NK
model. Yet, and as discussed in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), and
AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and VallØs (1999), standard speci￿cations of preferences and
the money growth process tend to rule out a liquidity eﬀect. In order to understand

















Under the baseline calibration we have σ =1 ; in that case, (27) implies that the
nominal rate will be proportional to the expected growth rate of money, ρm ∆mt.
To the extent that money growth is positively serially correlated (as it is the case in
our baseline calibration), the nominal rate will necessarily increase in response to a
monetary expansion.
Under what conditions can the liquidity eﬀect be restored ? Notice that, to the ex-








will generally be negative.26 Accordingly, the presence of a liquidity eﬀect requires a
suﬃciently high risk aversion parameter σ (for any ρm)o r ,g i v e nσ > 1,as u ﬃciently
low money growth autocorrelation ρm. The previous tradeoﬀ is clearly illustrated in
Figure 4, which displays the impact eﬀect on the nominal rate of a unit monetary
shock, as a function of σ and ρm. The bottom graph shows a sample of loci of σ
and ρm con￿g u r a t i o n sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hag i v e ni n t e r e s tr a t ec h a n g e .H e n c e ,t h ez e r o
locus represents the ￿liquidity eﬀect frontier￿: any {σ, ρm} combination above and
to the left of that locus will be associated with the presence of a liquidity eﬀect. We
see that, under the baseline calibration (ρm =0 .5), a risk aversion parameter of size
slightly above 4 is necessary to generate a liquidity eﬀect.
25In order to derive that expression ￿rst-diﬀerence (5) and combine the resulting expression with
(20); some algebraic manipulation then yields the expression in the text.
26Long run neutrality of money implies that limk→∞ Et{yt+k} =0 . Hence, the sign of the
summatory in (27) will be positive if (a) output￿s reversion to its initial level is monotonic (as in
the impulse response displayed in Figure 5), and/or (b) if η is suﬃciently large.
164.2 Technology Shocks
Proponents of the RBC paradigm have claimed a central role for exogenous variations
in technology as a source of observed economic ￿uctuations. On the other hand,
the analysis of models with nominal rigidities has tended to emphasize the role of
demand and, in particular, monetary disturbances as the main driving forces behind
the business cycle.
Recently, however, a number of papers have brought attention to a surprising as-
pect of the interaction between sticky prices and technological change. In particular,
Gal￿ (1999) and Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (1999; henceforth, BFK) have made the
following observation: in a model with imperfect competition and sticky prices, a
favorable technology shock is likely to induce a short run decline in employment, so
long as the response of the monetary authority falls short of full accommodation.27
That prediction is illustrated in Figure 5, where the dynamic responses of in￿ation,
the output gap, output, and employment to a one percent permanent increase in
productivity are displayed, using the baseline model developed above under the as-
sumption of a constant money supply. Figure 6 examines the robustness of that
prediction to changes in the degree of price rigidities and the risk aversion parameter,
by displaying the response of employment on impact for a range of values of those
parameters, as well as the corresponding contour plots. Hence we see that while a
negative response of employment to a favorable technology shock is not a necessary
implication of the model, that prediction appears to hold for a very large subset of
the parameter values considered. More speci￿cally, employment is seen to increase
in response to a positive technology shock only when a low risk aversion parameter
coexists with little nominal rigidities (i.e., the south-west corner of the ￿gure).
The intuition behind that result can be easily grasped by considering the case of an
interest-inelastic money demand, so that yt = mt − pt holds in equilibrium. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that the money supply remains unchanged in the wake of
a technology shock. Notice also that even though all ￿rms will experience a decline
in their marginal cost only a fraction of them will adjust their prices downwards
in the short run. Accordingly, the aggregate price level will decline, and aggregate
demand will rise, less than proportionally to the increase in productivity. That, in
turn, induces a decline in aggregate employment.28
The previous characterization of the economy￿s response to a positive technology
shock is clearly at odds with some central implications of the standard RBC model.
The latter￿s prediction of a positive short run comovement between productivity,
output and employment in response to technology shocks lies at the root of the
27Not surprisingly, the pattern of response of employment and any other variable will depend on
the systematic response of the monetary authority to those shocks, as argued in Dotsey (1999).
28BFK￿s model allows for the possibility of a short run decline in output after a positive technology
shock. That outcome can be ruled out in the baseline model considered here, under the assumption
of a constant money supply and σ =1 . In that case the nominal rate remains unchanged (see eq.
(27)), and output has to move in the opposite direction from prices (which go down).
17ability of an RBC model to replicate some central features of observed aggregate
￿uctuations, while relying on exogenous variations in technology as the only (or, at
least, the dominant) driving force.
But, how does the actual economy respond to technology shocks? Which of the
two competing frameworks does it favor? Gal￿ (1999) and BFK (1999) provide some
evidence pertaining to this matter, by estimating the responses of a number of vari-
ables to an identi￿ed technology shock. While the approach to identi￿cation is very
diﬀerent in the two cases, the results that emerge are similar: in response to a posi-
tive technology shock, labor productivity rises more than output, while employment
shows a persistent decline. Hence, conditional on technology as a driving force, the
data point to a negative correlation between employment and productivity, as well
as between employment and output. Both observations call into question the empiri-
cal relevance of the mechanism through which aggregate variations in technology are
transmitted to the economy in the basic RBC model. Perhaps most importantly, and
independently of the reference model, they raise serious doubts about the quantitative
signi￿cance of technology shocks as a source of aggregate ￿uctuations in industrialized
economies.
5 The Design of Monetary Policy
The previous section looked at the eﬀects of exogenous changes in the money supply
in the context of a calibrated sticky price model. The usefulness of that sort of
analysis is twofold. First, it helps us understand the way changes in monetary policy
are transmitted to a number of macroeconomic variables in the model of reference.
Second, it allows for an empirical evaluation of the underlying model, through a
comparison of the estimated responses to an exogenous monetary shock against the
model￿s predictions regarding the eﬀects of a monetary intervention that corresponds
to the experiment observed in the data.29 Yet, the limitations of such a speci￿cation of
monetary policy are by now well understood. For one, the common practice of modern
central banks does not involve the use of the quantity of money as a policy instrument,
and only very seldom as an intermediate target. Furthermore, the assumption of an
exogenous random process for the money supply (or any other policy instrument,
for that matter), while convenient for certain purposes, can hardly be viewed as
a plausible one, since it is equivalent to modeling monetary policy as a process of
randomization over the possible values of a policy instrument. This is clearly at odds
with even a casual observation of how central banks conduct monetary policy.
Instead, much recent research in monetary economics, both theoretical and em-
pirical, has de-emphasized the analysis of monetary shocks and its eﬀects, and turned
instead its focus on the endogenous component of monetary policy.30 There are several
29See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) for a discussion of that methodological approach.
30That shift in emphasis may not be unrelated to a common ￿nding in the structural VAR litera-
18natural questions that one can ask in that context. What are the goals of monetary
policy ? How should monetary policy be conducted in order to achieve those goals?
In particular, how should the monetary authority respond to diﬀerent shocks? What
are the losses from following simple rules, that depart from the optimal one?
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to attempt to provide a general treat-
ment of such important questions. Instead, I use the baseline sticky price model
developed above to illustrate how some of those questions can be addressed with the
tools of modern monetary theory. In order to keep things manageable, and to focus
on the role of nominal rigidities in the design of monetary policy, most of the analysis
maintains the assumption that the presence of such rigidities is the only distortion
left for the monetary authority to correct.
5.1 The Goals of Monetary Policy
In setting up the problem facing the monetary authority, we adopt the natural as-
sumption that it acts as a benevolent policymaker, i.e., it seeks to maximize the util-
ity of the representative household. That optimization problem is subject to some
economy-wide resource constraints, as well as institutional and/or informational con-
straints that may limit the sort of interventions that the monetary authority can
undertake.
In practice, the optimizing policymaker will seek to eliminate (or, at least, to
oﬀset as much as possible) any distortions that may exist in the economy. Models
of monetary economies with staggered price setting found in the literature would
typically have as many as four distortions, brie￿y described next.31
A ￿rst distortion results from agents￿ need or desire to allocate part of their
wealth to (non interest bearing) monetary assets, given the transaction services pro-
vided by the latter. The existence of a private opportunity cost of holding such
monetary balances coexisting with a zero social cost of producing them, generates
a transactions/monetary distortion. The elimination of that distortion requires that
the nominal interest rate is set to zero (the Friedman rule), in order to equate pri-
vate and social costs.32 The average level of in￿ation associated with a zero nominal
rate is given by minus the steady state equilibrium real rate (π = −ρ, in the frame-
work above). Hence, policies that seek to implement the Friedman rule will generally
ture: identi￿ed exogenous monetary policy disturbances account only for a relatively small portion of
the observed ￿uctuations in output and other macroeconomic variables, including monetary instru-
ments and aggregates. An important component of the latter￿s variations must hence be attributed
to the systematic reaction of the monetary authority to macroeconomic developments, i.e., to the
endogenous component of monetary policy. See Sims (1996), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999) for two recent overviews of that literature.
31See Khan, King, and Wolman (2000) and Woodford (1999c) for a detailed analysis of the role
played by each distortion in the design of monetary policy.
32See Correia and Teles (1999) for a modern treatment of the optimality of the Friedman rule in
classical monetary models, under a variety of assumptions.
19involve a steady decline in the price level.
A second distortion results from the existence of imperfect competition in the
goods market. That feature is re￿ected in prices that are, on average, above marginal
cost. In equilibrium, that property makes the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor (the real wage) diﬀer from their corresponding marginal rate
of transformation (the marginal product of labor). The existence of such a static
or average markup distortion is often invoked to rationalize an objective function
for the policymaker which penalizes deviations of the output gap xt from a positive
target x∗ > 0. The latter corresponds to the eﬃcient level of activity (i.e., the
one that would obtain under perfect competition). Thus, and in the absence of an
employment subsidy (v =0 ), the output gap target in the model of section 2 would
be given by x∗ =
￿
σ+ϕ. The steady state rate of in￿ation that would be associated
with that output gap can be easily derived using (19), and is approximately given
by π ’
λ￿
ρ > 0. Thus, using monetary policy to oﬀset the distortion created by the
existence of market power would require a departure from the Friedman rule, and
would thus con￿ict with attempts to reduce the monetary distortion.33
Notice that the two distortions just discussed would be operative even in the lim-
iting case of full price ￿exibility; in other words, they are not related to the presence
of nominal rigidities. In the subsequent analysis I choose to ignore the previous dis-
tortions, and focus instead on those resulting from the presence of sticky prices and
staggered price setting. This is equivalent to taking the welfare gains from holding
higher real balances to be small34 (relative to the utility derived from consumption of
goods and leisure), and to assume that the static market power distortion is exactly
oﬀset by means of an employment subsidy of the right size (￿nanced through lump
sum taxes). In such a world there would remain at least two additional distortions,
both directly related to the presence of sticky prices and the staggered nature of
price setting. On the one hand, ￿rms￿ inability to adjust prices each period in the
face of shocks will lead to persistent deviations of markups from their frictionless
level (equivalently, it will generate ineﬃcient ￿uctuations in the output gap). Let me
refer to that source of ineﬃciency as the dynamic markup distortion. In addition, the
lack of synchronization in price adjustments will generally imply the coexistence of
diﬀerent prices (and, hence, diﬀerent quantities produced and consumed) for goods
that enter consumers￿ preferences symmetrically and which have a one-to-one mar-
ginal rate of transformation. That relative price distortion induces an ineﬃciency in
the allocation of resources that remains even in the absence of markup ￿uctuations.35
33See King and Wolman (1996) for a comprehensive analysis of that long-run tradeoﬀ,a sw e l l
as a full characterization of the steady state of the Calvo model . Notice that under our baseline
calibration, and assuming a frictionless net markup of ten percent (￿ =0 .1) ,t h er a t eo fi n ￿ation
consistent with the eﬃcient level of activity would be about 80 percent per quarter.
34In models in which money is an argument in the utility function, that assumption is equivalent
to letting the coeﬃcient on real balances approach zero.
35Thus, in a steady state with nonzero in￿ation (and constant average markups), only a fraction
of individual prices will be adjusted each period, generating dispersion in relative prices.
20Interestingly, it turns out that in the model considered here the two distortions
associated with the presence of sticky prices (a) do not generate a policy trade-oﬀ,
and (b) can be fully corrected through an appropriate monetary policy. The optimal
policy requires that the markup of all ￿rms is fully stabilized at its ￿exible price
level. That stabilization will be attained only if the price level is fully stabilized
(permanent zero in￿ation), as implied by (22). In that environment, ￿rms that have
an opportunity to readjust their prices choose not to do so; that, in turn, requires
that they all charge a common optimal markup ￿ and, hence, share identical prices
and quantities (implying the absence of a relative price distortion). In other words,
the constraint on ￿rms￿ ability to adjust prices becomes nonbinding, and the ￿exible
price allocation is restored. Along with it, the fact that no ￿rm has an incentive to
change its price implies that the path of the aggregate price level is perfectly ￿at
(zero in￿ation).
In that context, and as shown in Woodford (1999c), the period utility losses
resulting from deviations from the ￿exible price allocation can be approximated by















Hence, the expected loss of utility resulting from departures from the optimal











Next I derive and characterize the monetary policy strategy that would minimize
those losses, and discuss some issues related to its implementation.
5.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
A monetary authority seeking to minimize the loss function (29) does not face any
trade-oﬀ: it will ￿nd it possible to fully stabilize both in￿ation and the output gap.
Thus, the optimal policy requires that:
xt = πt =0
all t. The resulting allocation under that policy replicates the (eﬃcient) ￿exible price
equilibrium allocation. Given the price stability requirement, the path for the nominal
rate consistent with the optimal policy will correspond to that of the real rate in the
￿exible price equilibrium. Hence, and given (14) the optimal policy implies:
36See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (1999c) for a derivation of the approximated
welfare loss function under alternative and more general assumptions, respectively.
21rt = rrt
= ρ + σψaρa ∆at + σ(1 − ψg)(1 − ρg) gt (30)
where we recall that ψa =
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ,a n dψg = σ
σ+ϕ. The intuition underlying the optimal-
ity of that interest rate response can be easily grasped by considering the adjustment
of consumption to both technology and ￿scal shocks in the ￿exible price case (see
(12)). Thus, an expansionary ￿scal shock lowers consumption on impact, with the
reversion to its initial level requiring a higher interest rate. On the other hand, as
long as there is positive serial correlation in productivity growth (ρa > 0), a positive
technology shock leads to a gradual adjustment of consumption to its new, higher
plateau; supporting that response pattern also requires a higher interest rate.37
5.2.1 Implementation
Interestingly, however, (30) cannot be interpreted as a monetary policy rule that the
central bank could follow mechanically, and which would guarantee that the optimal
allocation is attained. In order to see this, notice that, after plugging (30) into (20),

















Clearly, xt = πt =0 ,f o ra l lt, constitutes a solution to (31). Yet, a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of such a solution in a system with no
predetermined variables like (31) is that the two eigenvalues of AO lie inside the
unit circle.38 It is easy to check, however, that such a condition is not satis￿ed in
our case. More precisely, while both eigenvalues of AOcan be shown to be real and
positive, only the smallest one lies in the [0,1] interval. As a result there exists
a continuum of solutions in a neighborhood of (0,0) that satisfy the equilibrium
conditions (local indeterminacy). Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility
of equilibria displaying ￿uctuations driven by self-ful￿lling revisions in expectations
(stationary sunspot ￿uctuations).
That indeterminacy problem can be avoided, and the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium allocation restored, by having the central bank follow a rule which would make
37See Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2000) for evidence of an eﬃcient response by the Fed to
technology shocks during the Volcker-Greenspan period, which contrasts with the ineﬃcient response
observed during the pre-Volcker period.
38See, e.g., Blanchard and Kahn (1982).
22the interest rate respond to in￿ation and/or the output gap were those variables to
deviate from their (zero) target values. More precisely, suppose that the central bank
commits itself to following the rule:
rt = rrt + φπ πt + φx xt (32)
In that case, the equilibrium is described by a stochastic diﬀerence equation like
(31), with AO replaced with
AT = Ω
"
σ 1 − βφπ
σκ κ+ β(σ + φx)
#
where Ω = 1
σ+φx+κφπ .If we restrict ourselves to non-negative values of φπ and φx,
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for AT to have both eigenvalues inside the unit
circle (thus implying uniqueness of the (0,0) solution to (31)) is given by39
κ (φπ − 1) + (1 − β) φx > 0 (33)
Notice that, once uniqueness is restored, the term φπ πt + φx xt appended to
the interest rate rule vanishes, implying that rt = rrt all t. Hence, we see that
stabilization of the output gap and in￿ation requires a credible threat by the central
bank to vary the interest rate suﬃciently in response to any deviations of in￿ation
and/or the output gap from target; yet, the very existence of that threat makes its
eﬀective application unnecessary.
5.2.2 Discussion
A common argument against the practical relevance of a monetary policy rule like
(32) stresses the fact that its implementation requires having far more information
than that available to actual central banks.40 For one, the speci￿cf o r mo ft h eo p -
timal policy rule is not robust to changes in some of the model characteristics; its
correct application thus hinges on knowledge of the true model and of the values
taken by all its parameters. In addition, it requires that the central bank be able to
observe and respond (contemporaneously) to the realizations of the diﬀerent shocks
(at and gt, in the present model ). This is not likely to be the case in practice, given
the well known problems associated with measurement of variables like total factor
productivity, not to mention the practical impossibility of detecting exogenous shifts
in some parameters that may be unobservable by nature (e.g., parameters describing
preferences).41
39See, e.g., Bullard and Mitra (1999).
40See Blinder (1998) for a discussion of the practical complications facing central bankers in the
design and implementation of monetary policy.
41Given the inherent diﬃculties in measuring the output gap, the previous argument would also
seem to apply to the central bank￿s need to respond to that variable in order to avoid the indeter-
minacy problem. But it is clear from (33) that the equilibrium is unique even if φx =0 ,s ol o n ga s
φπ > 1.
23The practical diﬃculties in implementing optimal rules have led many authors
to propose a variety of simple rules as possible alternatives, and to evaluate their
desirability in the context of one or more models. A large number of recent papers
have sought to analyze the properties and desirability of many such rules.42 In the
next subsection I describe three of them and examine their properties in the context
of the baseline sticky price model developed above.
5.3 Simple Policy Rules
Here I embed three alternative simple rules in the baseline sticky price model and
analyze their basic properties. The following three rules are considered in turn: a
Taylor rule, a constant money growth rule, and an interest rate peg.
5.3.1 A Simple Taylor Rule
Let us assume that the central bank follows the rule
rt = ρ + φπ πt + φx xt (34)
i.e., the nominal rate responds systematically to the contemporaneous values of in-
￿ation and the output gap. This is a version of the rule put forward by John Taylor
as a good characterization of U.S. monetary policy, and analyzed in numerous recent
papers.43











+ BT (rrt − ρ)
where AT and rrt are de￿ned as above, and BT = Ω [1,κ]0.A s l o n g a sφπ and φx
satisfy condition (33), the previous system has a unique stationary solution which
c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
42See, e.g., the contributions by several authors contained in theTaylor (1999) volume.
43See Taylor (1993, 1999) and Judd and Rudebusch (1988). Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1998,
2000) estimate a forward looking version of that rule, in which the interest rate is assumed to
respond to anticipated in￿ation and output gap, instead of the realized values. Orphanides (1999)
discusses the diﬃculties and perils of implementing a Taylor-type rule in real time.
Strictly speaking, the output component in Taylor￿s original rule involves the percent deviations of
output from a smooth (linear) trend. In the model considered here, such deviations are permanent
since output has a unit root in equilibrium, implying that there is no deterministic trend or steady
state value that output reverts to. As a consequence, a rule of that sort would prevent the economy
from adjusting to its long run equilibrium path. On the other hand, the output gap {xt} follows
a stationary process, so that its inclusion in the rule will not lead to permanent deviations of the





= ωa [I − ρaAT]
−1BT ∆at + ωg [I − ρgAT]
−1BT gt
where ωa = σψaρa and ωg = σ(1 − ψg)(1 − ρg).44
Notice that in the particular case that both at and gt follow a pure random walk
(ρa =0 , ρg =1 ), we have xt = πt =0 ,a l lt; i.e. the Taylor rule supports the
optimal allocation. The reason is simple: the Taylor rule will implement the eﬃcient
allocation only if the latter is supported by a constant (natural) real rate, as is the
case under the random walk assumption.
For more general driving processes, a monetary authority following a rule of the
form (34) could minimize the deviations from the optimal path by choosing suﬃciently
large values of φπ and/or φx.45 A Taylor rule with very high in￿ation or output
gap coeﬃcients, however, would potentially lead to huge instrument-instability: any
small deviation of in￿ation or the output gap from zero (perhaps resulting from
small measurement errors or imperfect credibility) would imply in￿nite changes in
the rate.46
If ρa ∈ (0,1) and/or ρg ∈ (0,1),h o w e v e r ,n o￿nite values of the coeﬃcients in
rule (34) will replicate the optimal responses of output and in￿ation. The reason is
straightforward: supporting the optimal response requires that prices remain stable
and that the real and ￿given zero in￿ation￿ and nominal rates change according to
(30) in response to technology and ￿scal shocks. But a Taylor rule will not generate
a change in the nominal rate unless a deviation from the optimal response arises in
the form of a nonzero in￿ation or output gap.
In order to get a sense of the quantitative eﬀects on macroeconomic stability
and welfare of having a central bank follow a simple Taylor rule (instead of the
optimal one), I have computed the standard deviations of in￿ation and the output
gap predicted by a calibrated version of the sticky price model. I set φπ =1 .5 and φx =
0.5, as in Taylor￿s original empirical rule. As argued above, avoiding the replication
of the eﬃcient allocation requires some departure from the random walk assumption
for the driving variables. I set ρa =0 .25 and σa =0 .01, which roughly correspond to
the ￿rst order serial correlation of U.S. GDP growth, and to the standard deviation
of the Solow residual innovations, respectively. In order to calibrate ρg and σg,I￿t
an AR(1) model to gt = −log(1 − τt), using the ratio of government purchases to
GDP in the U.S. as the empirical counterpart to τt. That procedure yields values
ρg =0 .95 and σg =0 .0036. The remaining parameters are set at their baseline values,
44Given xt , the equilibrium process for output and employment can be determined using the fact
that yt = xt + y∗
t, ct = xt + c∗
t,a n dnt = xt +n∗
t,w i t hy∗
t, c∗
t,a n dn∗
t given by (11), (12), and (13).
45Formally, this is the case because Ω (and, hence, BT) converges to zero as φπ or φx approach
in￿nity.
46Furthermore, the lack of credibility of such a policy might be more than warranted since it
would easily hit the zero-bound on the nominal rate.
25but results are also reported for two parameter variations: a calibration with higher
risk aversion (σ =5 ) , as well as one with weaker nominal rigidities (θ =0 .5).
The ￿rst set of columns in Table 1 displays some summary statistics for the
resulting equilibrium. In the baseline case the volatility of both in￿ation and the
output gap is extremely small, independently of the type shock; as a result the implied
welfare losses associated with the deviations from the eﬃcient allocation are tiny,
amounting to less than one hundredth of a percent of steady state consumption.
Things do not change dramatically when we increase the degree of risk aversion
(second panel) or lower the degree of price stickiness (third panel); most noticeably,
however, the volatility of in￿ation increases in both cases while that of the output
gap decreases. Either way, the utility losses resulting from following a Taylor rule
instead of the optimal one remain very small.
5.3.2 Money Growth Peg
Next I study the consequences of having the monetary authority maintain a constant
rate of growth for the money supply, in the face of both supply and demand shocks.
Without loss of generality, and for consistency with the steady state with zero in￿ation
and no secular output growth, I assume ∆mt =0 , for all t. After de￿ning mpyt =
mt − pt − yt, one can represent the equilibrium dynamics under that speci￿cation of




























































The second set of columns in Table 1 summarizes some of the statistical properties
of the resulting equilibrium. The volatility of both in￿ation and the output gap
resulting from technology shocks is substantially greater than that observed under a
Taylor rule, whereas the diﬀerence is less pronounced for demand shocks. The welfare
losses are no longer negligible, amounting to one quarter of a percent of steady state
consumption when both shocks are operative.
5.3.3 Interest Rate Peg
The third rule considered here consists of pegging the nominal interest rate at a level
rt = ρ, i.e. the level consistent with a zero steady state in￿ation. If interpreted as
a rule followed mechanically by the central bank, such a speci￿cation of monetary
policy is only a particular case of a simple Taylor rule with φπ = φx =0.B u t ,a sa r -
gued above, such con￿guration of parameters renders the equilibrium indeterminate.
26What rule would support a constant nominal rate while guaranteeing determinacy?
Consider the following candidate:
rt = ρ + φr (πt + σ ∆ct) (35)
where φr > 1. Combining the previous rule with (4) yields the diﬀerence equation
πt + σ ∆ct = φ
−1
r Et{πt+1 + σ ∆ct+1}
whose only stationary solution satis￿es πt = −σ ∆ct, which in turn implies a constant
nominal rate rt = ρ, for all t. Rule (35) can be viewed as a modi￿ed Taylor rule,
with consumption growth replacing the output gap. In addition, the in￿ation and
consumption growth coeﬃcients must satisfy a certain proportionality condition: the
size of the coeﬃcient on consumption must be exactly σ times that of in￿ation (which
in turn must be greater than one). Notice also that the assumption of log utility
(σ =1 )c o m b i n e dw i t ht h ea b s e n c eo f￿scal shocks (∆ct = ∆yt) implies a constant
nominal GDP; in that case an interest rate peg is equivalent to strict nominal income
targeting, and both can be implemented by (35).
Using the fact that πt = −σ (∆xt + ∆c∗
t), combined with (19) and (12), one can















































where b1 = ψa(1 − βρa), b2 = −(1 − ψg)(1 + β(1 − ρa)),a n db3 =( 1− ψg).
The third vertical panel in Table 1 reports the volatility of output and in￿ation
as well as the welfare losses under an interest rate peg. Notice that, under the
assumption of σ =1 , and conditional on technology shocks being the only source
of ￿uctuations, the statistics shown match exactly those under a money growth peg.
This is no coincidence: in that case a constant money growth implies a constant
nominal rate, and viceversa; accordingly the resulting allocations are identical and,
as discussed above, they are characterized by sizable ￿uctuations in both the output
gap and in￿ation. In the high risk aversion case (σ =5 ) that equivalence no longer
holds, and the deviations from the optimal allocation are more pronounced under the
interest rate peg (the welfare losses in the latter case get close to half a percent of
steady state consumption). When demand shocks are the source of ￿uctuations, the
performance of an interest rate peg is uniformly worse than a money growth peg, and
far worse than a Taylor rule.
5.3.4 Discussion
The analysis above has sought to illustrate, in the context of a basic sticky price
model, some of the results on the properties of simple rules found in the literature.
Some general lessons can be drawn.
27First, supporting as an equilibrium the combination of prices and quantities that
the central bank seeks to attain￿in our case, the ￿exible price allocation with zero
in￿ation￿generally requires (possibly large) variations in both interest rates and mon-
etary aggregates. Hence, simple policy rules that keep one of those variables constant
is likely to cause signi￿cant deviations from the desired outcome.
Second, we expect that in the target allocation the pattern of response of interest
rates and monetary aggregates will generally diﬀer across shocks. Hence, the fact
that a simple rule provides a good approximation to the optimal policy conditional
on a certain source of ￿uctuations does not guarantee a good performance if other
shocks become dominant.
Third, a simple interest rate rule ￿ la Taylor does a remarkably good job at
approximating the outcome of the optimal policy in a calibrated version of the basic
sticky price model. A similar result can be found in a variety of papers that use
related, but not identical, frameworks. Furthermore, several authors have emphasized
the robustness of the Taylor rule across a variety of models, relative to more complex
policy rules (including those that are optimal for some model).47
A key feature of the simple Taylor rule considered here is that it makes the interest
rate respond (in a stabilizing direction) to deviations from target in in￿ation and the
output gap, i.e. precisely the variables that enter the loss function used to evaluate
alternative policies. That feature underlies, undoubtedly, the good performance of
the rule. From that point of view, it is worth noting that the speci￿cation of a
simple Taylor rule used here is likely to be more desirable than an alternative, more
conventional one, in which the interest rate is assumed to respond to deviations of
output from trend (instead of its deviation from its natural rate). As stressed in
McCallum and Nelson (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Gal￿ (2000),
a strong response to (detrended) output may be highly ineﬃcient when shocks to
fundamentals call for large changes in output. The output gap induced by such a
policy will, in turn, lead to unnecessary ￿uctuations in in￿ation. It is not surprising,
thus, that a pure in￿ation targeting rule (i.e., one with little or no weight attached
to output stabilization) may often do better than one which is also concerned about
output stabilization.48
47See, among others, Ireland (2000), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Levin, Wieland and
Williams (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2000).
48Orphanides (1999) stresses an additional advantage of an in￿ation targeting rule: it avoids the
risks associated with having the monetary authority respond to output gap indicators ridden with
large and persistent measurement error. According to Orphanides￿ analysis that problem may have
been at the root of the great in￿a t i o no ft h e7 0 si nt h eU S .
285.4 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Presence of an Output
Gap/In￿ation Tradeoﬀ
As discussed earlier, the baseline sticky price model analyzed above embeds no trade-
oﬀ between in￿ation and output gap stabilization: by following an appropriate policy,
the monetary authority can attain the eﬃcient allocation, i.e., the one corresponding
to an equilibrium in which both in￿ation and the output gap are constant.
The lack of an in￿ation/output tradeoﬀ is viewed by many economists as an unap-
pealing feature of the previous framework. That consideration has led some authors
to amend the basic model in a way which adds some realism to the policymaker￿s
problem, while preserving the tractability of the original model.49 A simple, largely
ad-hoc, way to achieve that objective is to augment the in￿ation equation with a dis-
turbance that generates a trade-oﬀ between in￿ation and the output gap. Formally:
πt = β Et{πt+1} + κ xt + ut (36)
where ut is a shock that implies a change in the equilibrium level of in￿ation consistent
with the natural level of output. That shock is often referred to in the literature as
a cost-push shock. For simplicity I assume that {ut} follows a white noise process
with a zero mean and variance σ2
u. The existence of a tradeoﬀ c a nb es e e nc l e a r l yb y





k Et{xt+k} + ut
Thus, an adverse cost-push shock (a positive realization in ut) necessarily leads
to a rise in in￿ation, and/or a negative output gap (current or anticipated).
Consider, as a benchmark, the macroeconomic and welfare implications of a mon-
etary policy that would fully accommodate the in￿ationary eﬀects of a cost-push
shock, by maintaining output at its natural level at all times. In that case we would
have xt =0and πt = ut for all t. Using (29) we can derive an expression for the
expected welfare loss (expressed as a percent of steady state consumption) incurred





If we normalize the standard deviation of the shock to be one percent (σu =0 .01),
we see that under the baseline calibration that welfare loss (relative to the eﬃcient
allocation) amounts to 0.64 % of steady state consumption.
Of course, there is no reason why a central bank would want to accommodate
fully a cost-push shock. Instead, it will want to respond to such a shock so that the
49See, e.g., Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999).
29resulting path of in￿ation and the output gap minimizes the utility loss. Formally,










subject to the sequence of budget constraints (36). Given the resulting optimal path
for {xt,πt} we can use (20) to derive the interest rate policy that would support such
ap a t h .
The form of the solution to the above problem depends critically on the assump-
tions we make regarding the central bank￿s ability to commit to future policy actions.
Below I describe the optimal policy and its macroeconomic implications under two
alternative, polar assumptions: discretion vs. commitment.
Before turning to the formal analysis it is important to stress the connection
between the results presented here and the early literature on credibility and gains
from commitment. The latter, exempli￿ed by the work of Kydland and Prescott
(1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogoﬀ (1985), brought to light the risk of
a persistent in￿ation bias arising from the central bank￿s inability to commit to a
low in￿ation policy. In their framework, the ultimate source of that bias could be
found in the central bank￿s desire to push output above its natural (￿exible price)
level, presumably because the latter is ineﬃciently low.50 Without such a bias an
eﬃcient outcome characterized by zero output and zero in￿ation can be attained
under discretion. In other words, in the absence of an in￿ation bias there would not
be any gains from commitment.
In the optimizing sticky price model considered here, the previous result no longer
holds. Instead, and as shown in Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(1999b), even in the absence of an in￿ation bias there are potential welfare gains
associated with the central bank￿s ability to commit credibly to a systematic pattern
of response to shocks that generate a tradeoﬀ between output and in￿ation. Next I
show that result using the baseline NK model.
5.4.1 Optimal Discretionary Policy
Suppose that the monetary authority cannot credibly commit to any future policy
actions. Since it is unable to in￿uence current expectations on future output and
in￿ation, it has to take those expectations as given. Accordingly, each period it will







πt = κ xt + θt
50In that case the terms involving x2
t in the loss function are replaced with (xt−x∗)2 where x∗ > 0
denoted the output gap target.
30where θt = β Et{πt+1} + ut is taken as given by the central bank. The solution to
the problem above must satisfy:
xt = −επ t (38)












Hence, in response to an adverse cost-push shock the central bank ￿nds it optimal
to engineer a temporary reduction in output, thus dampening the eﬀect of the shock
on in￿ation. The incentive to ￿split￿ the eﬀects of the shock between output and
in￿ation is a consequence of the convexity of the loss function in those variables.
The expected welfare loss under the optimal discretionary policy is given by:
εσ 2
u
2 λ (1 + κε)
￿ 100
which is always lower than the loss under the fully accommodating policy.
Under the baseline calibration the standard deviations of the output gap and
(annualized) in￿ation when the central bank pursues the optimal discretionary policy
are 3.80 % and 1.38 %, respectively. The implied welfare loss amounts now to 0.22
% of steady state consumption.
Using (20), we see that the implied equilibrium interest rate under the optimal
discretionary policy is given by:





Notice that a simple interest rate rule that would support (39) and (40) is given
by:
rt = rrt + σε πt (41)
As discussed earlier, the previous rule will guarantee that the desired allocation
obtains if and only if σε > 1, a condition that is satis￿ed for plausible values of those
parameters. Alternatively, a rule of the form





ut + φπ πt
with φπ > 1 will always guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium.
315.4.2 Optimal Policy With Commitment
Suppose that the monetary authority can choose, once and for all, a state-contingent
policy {x(zt),π(zt)}∞
t=0 where zt denotes the history of shocks up to period t,a n d
assume it sticks to its plan. The equilibrium dynamics for the output gap and in￿ation
under the optimal policy with commitment can be shown to satisfy the optimality
condition:51
xt = −ε (pt − p
∗) (42)
for t =0 ,1,2,...where p∗ can be interpreted as a price level target, which corresponds
to the (log) price level in the period before the monetary authority chooses (once and
for all) its optimal plan (i.e., p∗ = p−1).
Combining (42) with (36), one can derive a stochastic diﬀerence equation for the
output gap implied by the optimal policy:
xt = ax t−1 + aβ Et{xt+1} − aε ut
for t =0 ,1,2,...where a = 1
1+β+κε. The (nonexplosive) solution to the previous diﬀer-
ence equation is given by:





2aβ ∈ (0,1) and ψu = a (1 + βδ
2).W ec a nt h e nu s e( 4 2 )t od e r i v e
the equilibrium process for e pt = pt − p∗, the deviation of the price level from target:
e pt = δ e pt−1 + ψu ut (44)
Thus, we see that the optimal policy with commitment implies a stationary process
for the price level, i.e., the deviations of the price level from the target level p∗ are
only transitory, with any in￿ation resulting from a cost-push shock being eventually
followed by de￿ation.
The pattern of responses for (annualized) in￿ation and the output gap under
commitment is depicted graphically in Figure 7, which also displays the responses
under the optimal discretionary policy. The ￿gure illustrates two aspects of the
diﬀerences in outcome that are worth pointing out. First, one can show that the
possibility of commitment improves the terms of the output-in￿ation trade-oﬀ facing
the policymaker. This is illustrated in Figure 7 where we see that the increase in
in￿ation resulting from a unit cost-push shock is smaller under commitment than
under discretion, even though the associated decline in the output gap is also smaller.
That result has a simple explanation, directly related to the forward-looking nature
51See Woodford (1999b) and Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) for a derivation. The latter paper
also analyzes the (simpler) case of commitment under the constraint that both the output gap and
in￿ation are a function of the current state only, not of its entire history.
32of in￿ation: the response of in￿ation to a cost-push shock depends on the anticipated
path for the output gap. Under discretion, the output gap returns to zero once
the shock dies out. Accordingly, the initial response of in￿ation is proportional to
the initial decline in the output gap, given the shock. By way of contrast, under
commitment the output gap remains negative well after the direct eﬀects of the shock
have vanished, and returns to its initial level only asymptotically; the anticipation of
that low level of economic activity in the future has, in itself, a dampening eﬀect on
in￿ation, thus explaining the smaller rise of in￿ation under commitment, despite the
smaller decline in output.
Second, it is clear that the joint pattern of output and in￿ation under commitment
in the periods following the shock is time-inconsistent. Since both in￿ation and the
output gap take on negative values (and thus generate a welfare loss), it would be
optimal (as well as feasible) for a central bank that did not feel restrained by its
earlier promises to pursue a more expansionary policy and to restore the eﬃcient
allocation.
Since the optimal discretionary policy falls within the range of feasible policies
available to a policymaker with access to a commitment technology, it is not surpris-
ing that the welfare losses associated with the optimal policy with commitment are
smaller than in the discretion case. Thus, for instance, under our baseline calibration,
the welfare loss represents 0.17 % of steady state consumption (compared to 0.22 %
in the discretionary case). Underlying that loss in welfare in the numerical example,
we have a standard deviations of the output gap and (annualized) in￿ation given by
3.17 % and 1.39 %, respectively (compared to 3.80 % and 1.38 % under discretion).
6 Staggered Wage Setting
The analysis up to this point has been based on a stylized model in which imper-
fect competition and sticky prices in the goods market coexist with a labor market
characterized by perfect competition and ￿exible wages. Up until recently, that was
the framework that seemed to be favored in macroeconomic analysis. One possible
reason for that choice may be that an alternative framework which emphasized wage
stickiness (and perfectly competitive good markets) would tend to predict, counter-
factually, a procyclical behavior of real wages, at least if demand shocks were the
dominant source of ￿uctuations.
Yet, several authors have studied recently the consequences of introducing nominal
rigidities (with or without price rigidities) in a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work. In the present section I lay out an extension of the baseline sticky price model
that incorporates staggered wage setting.52
52Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) contains an early analysis of a static model with both wage and
price stickiness. The model developed here is a simpli￿ed version of the one analyzed in Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000). Kim (2000) develops a model in a similar spirit, but where the
stickiness of wages and prices results from the existence of adjustment costs. Erceg (1997) and
336.1 A Simple Model of Staggered Wage and Price Setting
Consider a continuum of labor types, indexed by j ∈ [0,1].T h ee ﬀective labor input
in the production process of a typical ￿rm is given by a CES function of the quantities









where εw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between labor types in production.












is an aggregate wage index.
Each household specializes in supplying a diﬀerentiated type of labor. Total de-
mand for labor of type j, Nt(j)=
R 1









0 Nit di denotes aggregate labor input.
If all households could set their wage optimally every period they would do so






the desired markup of the real wage over the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure mrst = σ ct + ϕ nt.
Staggered wage setting is introduced by assuming that each household faces a
probability θw of having to keep the wage for its labor type unchanged in any given
period. Let w∗
t denote the (log) wage set by households adjusting wages in period
t. The evolution of the aggregate wage level over time can be approximated by the
log-linear diﬀerence equation:
wt = θw wt−1 +( 1− θw) w
∗
t (45)








k Et{mrst,t+k + pt+k} (46)
Huang and Liu (1999) analyze the eﬀects of exogenous monetary policy shocks in a model with
wage contracts ￿ la Taylor.
34where mrst,t+k = σ ct+k + ϕ nt,t+k ,w i t hnt,t+k being the quantity of labor supplied
in period t+k by a household whose wage was last reset in period t.53 The intuition
behind the previous wage setting rule is analogous to that for price setting: households
(workers) will set the nominal wage so that a weighted average of the expected wage
markup over the duration of the contract matches the frictionless optimal markup
￿w.




one can rewrite (46) in terms of aggregate variables as follows:
w
∗


















t =( wt−pt)−mrst−￿w can be interpreted as the percent deviation between
the average wage markup and its frictionless level.
Combining (45) and (47) we obtain the wage in￿ation equation:
π
w
t = β Et{π
w





θw(1+ϕεw) . Notice also the following relationship between the wage
markup and the real marginal cost:
mct =( wt − pt) − at
= ￿
w
t + mrst − at
= ￿
w
t +( σ + ϕ) yt − (1 + ϕ) at − σ gt
It follows that d mct =( σ + ϕ) xt + b ￿w
t ,w h e r ext denotes the (log) deviation of
output from its level in the absence of both price and wage rigidities.54
One can combine the previous results with (17) (whose derivation was independent
of the presence or not of wage rigidities), to obtain a version of the New Phillips Curve
for an economy with staggered wage setting
πt = β Et{πt+1} + κ xt + λ b ￿
w
t (49)
Interestingly, (49) seems to provide a theoretical justi￿cation for the inclusion of
the cost-push disturbance in (36), as a way to generate a trade-oﬀ between output
and in￿ation. Yet, an important diﬀerence remains: the disturbance thus generated
53Notice that the level of consumption is the same across households, as a result of risk sharing.





σ+ϕ , i.e., the output gap is proportional to the sum of the





it follows that the output gap is proportional to the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation, and hence
it is a measure of the (uncorrected) aggregate distortions in the economy.
35cannot be assumed to be exogenous, since it will generally depend on preference and
technology parameters, as well as on the underlying disturbances.55
6.1.1 A Particular Case: Sticky Wages and Flexible Prices
Consider the polar case with sticky wages but fully ￿exible prices. In that case
all ￿rms face identical marginal costs and charge identical prices, consistent with
the desired markup (i.e., b ￿
p
t =0 ). As a result there is no relative price distortion
and the variance of price in￿ation should no longer be a central bank￿s concern. In
that case it is possible for the central bank to replicate the ￿exible price and wage
allocation by having b ￿
w
t = πw
t = xt =0 , for all t. It follows that price in￿ation under
the optimal policy will be given by πt = −∆at,f o ra l lt. The prescription of full
price stabilization is no longer desirable in that environment; the monetary authority
should seek to stabilize wages instead.
The nominal rate that will support that eﬃcient allocation will have to satisfy:
rt = rrt + Et{πt+1}
= ρ +
(σ − 1) ϕρ a
σ + ϕ
∆at + σ(1 − ψg)(1 − ρg) gt
6.2 Optimal Monetary Policy When Both Wages and Prices
Are Sticky
Can the allocation associated with ￿exible prices and wages be restored when both
prices and wages are sticky ? The answer is no, as shown in Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000; henceforth EHL). The reason is straightforward: replicating that
allocation requires b ￿
p
t = b ￿
w
t =0 , for all t. It would then follow from (17) and (48) that
πw
t = πt =0 , which in turn implies a constant real wage. But that is inconsistent with
the requirement that the real wage adjusts on a one-to-one basis with the marginal
product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution if the real marginal cost and
the wage markup are to remain constant. To the extent that the equilibrium in the
model with ￿exible wages and prices involves ￿uctuations in either variable (as it will
generally be the case), the eﬃcient allocation will not be attainable.
Given the existence of a tradeoﬀ between stabilization of the output gap, price
in￿ation and wage in￿ation, what is the appropriate course of action for a policymaker
seeking to maximize consumers￿ welfare ? EHL have derived the loss function for an
economy with wage and price stickiness, thus generalizing the analysis of Rotemberg
and Woodford. The resulting loss function, expressed as a fraction of steady state
consumption, is given by:















Notice that λ and λw are decreasing in the degree of price and wage rigidities
(respectively), as parameterized by θp and θw. Hence, the monetary authority will
attach a relatively greater weight to price (wage) in￿ation stabilization the stronger
(weaker) price rigidities are relative to wage rigidities.56 T h eb a s e l i n es t i c k yp r i c e
model analyzed in the previous sections corresponds to the limiting case λw → +∞,
so that wage in￿ation stabilization stops being a concern (a symmetric result hold
for the ￿exible price case). Notice that the welfare loss associated with a given level
of price or wage in￿ation is proportional to the elasticities of substitution among
diﬀerent goods and diﬀerent types of labor, respectively. That result re￿ects the fact
that the degree of substitutability will enhance the (ineﬃcient) dispersion in output
and employment levels generated by the staggering of prices and/or wages in an
environment with nonzero in￿ation.
EHL (2000) use numerical methods to derive the optimal policy rule in an economy
similar to the one just described, and determine the implied volatility of the output
gap, price in￿ation and wage in￿ation, as well as the associated welfare losses. Among
other results, they show that when prices are more (less) rigid than wages, the optimal
policy requires that wages (prices) account for a relatively larger share of the real wage
adjustment; as a consequence, the rate of in￿a t i o no ft h em o r e￿exible variable ends
up displaying higher volatility (in a way consistent with its smaller weight in the loss
function). EHL also show that, for a variety of calibrations, simple rules that put a
lot of weight on wage in￿ation and/or output gap stabilization perform nearly as well
as the optimal one.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The present paper has surveyed a number of results generated by recent research on
monetary policy in dynamic optimizing models with nominal rigidities. In my opinion,
that research program has yieded several new insights, as well as a number of results
that one may view as surprising, regarding the linkages between monetary policy, in-
￿ation and the business cycle. In other words, and contrary to what some economists
might have predicted, the eﬀort to integrate Keynesian-type elements into a dynamic
GE framework has gone beyond ￿providing rigorous microfoundations￿ to some pre-
existing, though largely ad-hoc, framework. Furthermore, that research program is
making signi￿cant progress towards the development of a standard framework that
can be used meaningfully for the purpose of evaluating alternative monetary policies.
56Benigno (1999) obtains a related result when analyzing the optimal policy in a monetary union:
the central bank should put more weight to stabilization of the rate of in￿a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m y
facing stronger nominal rigidities.
37Perhaps the clearest proof of that potential lies in the renewed interest shown by
many central banks in the recent academic research on monetary economics.
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42Table 1
Properties of Three Simple Monetary Policy Rules
Taylor Rule Money Growth Peg Interest Rate Peg
shocks shocks shocks
supply demand both supply demand both supply demand both
Baseline
σ(π) 0.15 0.15 0.21 2.29 0.18 2.30 2.29 0.28 2.31
σ(x) 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.98 0.11 0.98 0.98 0.16 0.99
% Welfare Loss 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.221 0.001 0.222 0.22 0.003 0.22
σ = 5
σ(π) 0.23 0.30 0.38 0.70 0.30 0.76 3.42 0.39 3.44
σ(x) 0.08 0.007 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.40 0.06 0.41
% Welfare Loss 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.020 0.003 0.023 0.474 0.006 0.48
θ = 0.5
σ(π) 0.47 0.20 0.51 3.18 0.31 3.20 3.18 0.46 3.22
σ(x) 0.08 0.002 0.08 0.38 0.05 0.39 0.38 0.07 0.39
% Welfare Loss 0.0016 0.0003 0.002 0.070 0.001 0.071 0.070 0.001 0.072cbo
quadratic trend
hp-filter
Figure 1. Three Conventional Output Gap Measures
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Figure 2. Model-Based Output Gap vs. Detrended GDP
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Figure 3: Dynamic Responses to a Monetary Shock            
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Figure 5: Dynamic Responses Responses to a Technology Shock
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Inflation under Commitment [*] and under Discretion [o] 
Figure 7. Commitment vs. Discretion
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